There are five levels in social inquiry: ontology; epistemology; approaches; methodology; and methods, which we see as means of gathering information. There is no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all the way down. We can cross between what are often seen as competing world views, at various of these levels. Natural sciences have not arrived at a unified field theory and there is no reason why social sciences have to do so.
epistemological position and combine approaches in rather pragmatic ways. At the same time, methodological pluralism represents a normative view that in order for the social science to develop, we need to promote diversity, rather than a single way of doing things. Here, we go beyond relativism, as acknowledgment of the existence of different ways of doing things, and to stress what unites, instead than what divides the social sciences; unity, however comes from opening up the field rather than insisting on conformity to one model.
[Key Quote 1 about here]
Science Wars
The social sciences are given to recurrent debates and disputes about approaches, methodologies and methods, which often take the form of a dichotomous contrast running between opposing world views. On each side we are presented with a pillar running from ontology, through epistemology and on to specific methods, with no possibility of crossing over to other pillar or mixing elements from each. For example, Marsh and Stoker (1995: 290) wrote that '…within the discipline there are authors utilising perspectives as diverse as rational choice theory and discourse analysis. The former operates from a positivist epistemological position and emphasises quantitative analysis; the latter operates from a relativist epistemological position and concentrates on qualitative analysis.' By the third edition of their book, they presented a much more complex picture (Marsh and Stoker, 2010) .
We agree that the Manichean vision is misleading. We identified, in
Approaches and Methodologies, five levels of social inquiry that need to be addressed, and at which differences are manifested. The most basic is ontology, what the social world consists of, how far concepts correspond to real phenomena and what are the building blocks of analysis. The second is epistemology, of how we can know about the world. The third is approaches, schemes of analysis often based on assumptions about relationships, for example between rational-choice, actor-based approaches and culturalist or socio-biological approaches. The fourth is methodology, the way in which we operationalise our concepts and choose to analyse them. The fifth is methods, which we see as means of gathering information. While there is a close connection among these levels, we argued that there is no determinate relationship such that one school will consistently choose the same options all the way down. We therefore deny a necessary progress from a specific ontology  epistemology  approach  methodology  method.
The argument that social sciences must have a consistent set of ontologies and epistemologies owes a lot to the natural sciences, where knowledge is seen as consistent and cumulative. It is assumed in this analogy that science is about generating theories that reflect as accurately as possible the material world. Ironically, the natural sciences themselves can go for a long time without agreement on some of the fundamental building blocks of knowledge. Physics has two quite different conceptions of light, which are used as appropriate to answer questions or to explain different phenomena. Scientists might aspire to a unified or field theory that would resolve the conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics but this does not stop them from doing good science in the meantime; and it may be that the conflict will never be resolved. Nor does science always insist on an identity between theory and material reality; theories rather are often ways of understanding the hidden dimensions of phenomena not amenable to positivist description (which now seems to amount to most of the universe). Science proceeds rather by conceptualisation and both concepts and units of analysis depend on the question we are asking. As Rescher (1993: 41) notes: 'There is no simple, unique, ideally adequate concept-framework for "describing the world." The botanist, horticulturalist, landscape gardener and painter will operate from diverse cognitive "points of view" to describe the self-same garden.'
If this is so in relation to the natural world, it is even more so in the social domain. This is because, even more than in the natural sciences, we are relying on concepts at a high level of abstraction. Only if we insist on a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and a concrete social world can we insist that our concepts are correct and other people's are wrong (Kratochwil, 2008) . Indeed even most positivist social scientists will admit that social science works with concepts and abstractions that should not be 'reified'; but some of them nonetheless insist that there must be a single grid of concepts, usable for all purposes (Sartori, 2009 ).
Going beyond the epistemological level, choices have to be made throughout the research process, which are not always easy to align on one easily defined cleavage such as positivists versus interpretivism, and even less quantitative versus qualitative methods. There is, that is, not just one choice (and one Methodenstreit), but a plurality of choices and tensions. The presence of multiple points of contention makes dialogues between different positions, to a certain extent, easier. As pluralist approaches to group politics contend, overlapping conflicts also mean overlapping membership, and therefore blurred, permeable boundaries. Moreover, none of the issues of disagreement can be defined as a dichotomous choice, being rather continuum. Social science owes much both to natural science and to the humanities and indeed has developed as a 'third way' between then. It thus has the possibility of borrowing from one or the other or from both without having to confine itself to the epistemology or methods of either.
Beyond Dichotomies
Epistemological questions traditionally pits positivist versus interpretivist (hermeneutic) views, often linked with ontological assumptions about the existence of a physical world or the reality of the social world. In practice, assumptions about how we can capture the reality -and how much of it-vary in more subtle ways. Few believe that social scientists are able easily to get hold of the external reality, but few believe that a reality does not exist at all. Positivist researchers recognise the importance of concepts and theories as filters between the external reality and our knowledge of it, and the need to avoid reifying them. Constructivists do not abandon the search for some inter-subjective knowledge, however contextual and contested.
The focus on either the external reality or the subjective perception of it is a matter of degree, and often changes as we move from a research project to the next, or even as we report on our research. Critical realism provides an intuitively plausible middle ground that has now been given a rigorous intellectual justification (Bhaskar, 2002) .
[Key Quote 2 about here]
The same can be said of the division on the search for generalisable knowledge versus the understanding of specific case, or for explanation versus understanding.
Even though the various epistemological positions differ on their assumptions about social science's capacity to develop covering laws, most researchers combine, in a Gramscian way, pessimism of the reason with optimism of the will; they express some scepticism about our capacity to build general laws (and so test and test again the results of previous research), but also some hope that research on specific cases can produce results that are useful also to understand other cases.
Beyond the shifting balance between generalisable and contextual knowledge (often solved with the search for historically specific but generalisable knowledge) preferences vary on the means to achieve it. The debates between inductive construction of theories versus deductive verification/falsification of them cuts across positivists as well as constructivists. Indeed, the distinction itself can be exaggerated.
What is often described as the deductive approach, starting with a theory and testing it empirically, is not truly deductive, since deduction proceeds entirely by reasoning from premises. It is better described as the hypothetico-deductive approach or deductive/empirical approach, combining both pure theory and empirical work. Even the 'deductive' part of this is rarely truly deductive in practice. Rather, the initial hypotheses are constructed on the basis of previous research in a rather inductive manner. On the other hand, more directly inductive research usually starts from theoretical questions and produces new ones, without each time throwing away the results of previous work in order to start from the beginning. Grounded theory has long sought a middle way here (Glaser and Strauss, 1999) , although it now covers a broad field, with some its exponents more insistent on universalisation than others. As Howard S. Becker observed long ago, challenging the idea that quantitative and qualitative research each has its distinct epistemological assumptions : '(the) two styles of works do place differing emphasis on the understanding of specific of historical or ethnographic cases as opposed to general laws of social interaction. But the two styles also imply one another. Every analysis of a case rests, explicitly or implicitly, on some general laws, and every general law supposes that the investigation of particular cases would show that law at work' (Becker, 1996: 53-54.) Moving to methods, the traditional sharp distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods can be questioned. depend on ever more stringent assumptions (or both) and seek to round them out.
They do this by re-inventing old concepts while seeking to subject them to much the same logic as their existing models. The result is a reincorporation of ideas from adjacent fields or disciplines but while losing the richness of the concepts themselves. 
Towards Pluralism
Our pluralist proposal goes, however, beyond the observation of a plurality of methodological cleavages and the denial of the presence of one best way to knowledge. We also plea for a principled pluralism.
There are those who think that their own approach is right and that everyone should conform to it. Others think that they have the one right way but realize that it is not shared by everyone and they might even be in the minority, so others must be accommodated; these are the pragmatic pluralists. In Caterino and Schram's definition (2006: 4), the current state in political science is characterized as a constrained pluralism, that is 'a partial hegemony that limits methodological diversity'. This may take the form of liberal tolerance or what in the Cold War was known as peaceful coexistence. It may also take the form of a provisional pluralism in which the existence of a diversity of points of view can be considered to enrich the discipline but then provide a market in which truth will drive out error. So eventually pluralism will give way to received truth. This might be considered analogous to the natural sciences, were it not for the fact, as noted above, that the natural sciences last for a long time with competing theories. Then there are those who think that pluralism can be justified it itself; these are the principled pluralists, among whom we placed ourselves.
Principled pluralism,is more than the observation of the dilemma between complexity and parsimony and the varied approaches that it produces. Nor is it a matter of accepting the legitimacy of distinct and self-contained schools which, for practical reasons cannot be reconciled and which we must, as liberals, tolerate even where disagreeing with them. It is not merely a matter of humbly accepting the limits to knowledge. On the contrary, it is something positive. We argue for pluralism at a deep level and as an enduring feature of the social sciences.
This conception of pluralism is consistent with seeing the social sciences not as a single, cumulative enterprise but as a complex field (Steinmetz, 2005) .A pluralist vision involves some assumptions about the ways in which disciplines are perceived and in the narrative of their evolution. In this sense, it is not (only) normative, but also reflect on the existing plurality of ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies (not to speak of methods). There are multiple points of connection, comparison and mutual learning, which cannot be systematized or placed within exclusive schools and pillars. [Key Quote 4 about here]
A methodologically pluralist approach does not accept the teleological or linear narrative of institutionalization and paradigm consolidation. It thus avoids the circularity of continually re-introducing concepts in an illusory pursuit of completeness. Progress represents, rather, a dialectical process of challenge, incorporation and adaptation. Concepts borrowed from adjacent disciplines are not stripped down or adapted to the existing paradigm but taken seriously in their complexity. Of course, if we brought back in everything that might be relevant, we would be overwhelmed by complexity and defeat the purpose of the exercise, which is to gain some analytical leverage. Social knowledge must then by definition be partial and the search for a parsimonious and unified theory is an illusion.
Lastly, let us make clear what pluralism is not. It is not a matter merely of accepting the legitimacy of distinct and self-contained schools which, for practical reasons cannot be reconciled and which we must, as liberals, tolerate even where disagreeing with them. Nor is it merely a matter of humbly accepting the limits to knowledge. Pluralism does not entail a hybridity or synthesis in which differences disappear or purely pragmatic compromises are made. On the contrary, it is something positive at a rather deeper level and as an enduring feature of the social sciences.
Pluralism does not develop from pillarization. We can draw by a parallel here between methodological pluralism and social and cultural pluralism in contemporary liberal theory. Here the existence of distinct cultures is seen not as a problem but an asset, enriching the experience of society and individuals. For this, it is necessary that the diverse cultures not be sealed from each other but interact; but the condition for this is that they themselves be maintained rather than dissolving into the melting pot.
There may be syntheses of different approaches and some may be transformed radically, but the aim is not the creation of a unified theory; since we argue that such a theory is impossible, any effort to do so would stifle the development of the discipline. Pluralism emphatically does not entail a relativism or indifference, in which any approach must be considered as good as any other, with no basis for choosing between them; rather they must challenge each other and defend themselves on the basis of their utility for answering the questions that they pose. A nihilism that contends that questions cannot be answered does not meet this requirement any more than does an insistence on the strict canons of positivism.
A European approach?
It would contradict our central argument to advocate a single European political science or to identify some essential items to distinguish it from the American variety.
Yet the European context is important. Exponents of rational choice, of constructivism or of historical institutionalism are much the same on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, however, there is a greater plurality of approaches. National intellectual traditions are multiple, and there is less of a tendency for one approach to dominate at any time or in any institution. As with the European project itself, different perspectives and expectations must live together in greater or lesser harmony without a shared telos.
Speaking of national traditions risks reifying them and suggesting a uniformity that does not exist, yet certain ideas continue to be stressed in particular countries, as do specific approaches. For example, the concept of the state has a meaning in France and Germany that is difficult to convey in the United States or the United Kingdom.
By contrast, American scholars, while downplaying the concept of the state in domestic politics, often give it supreme importance in international relations. French social science traditionally tends to an abstraction that contrasts with the empiricism of the English-speaking world. As emerging disciplines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political science and sociology were linked in some countries to the older disciplines of history and law and these legacies are still visible.
In many countries, international relations emerged as a discipline separate from comparative politics. The division between political science and sociology is sharper in the United Kingdom and the United States than in France or Italy. Sometimes these contrasts reflect differences in the political and social realities of the countries concerned. France has traditionally had a strong state. American politics has revolved around interest-group pluralism within a rather narrowly defined value system (at least until the revival of the religious cleavage). Yet the difference in intellectual emphasis does not always reflect an underlying social reality, as opposed to different ways of thinking about politics and society. There is thus great value in taking the concepts and ideas from one country and seeking to apply them comparatively, and more generally in seeking concepts that travel, both as an aid to comparative research and as an antidote to methodological nationalism.
[ It would be deeply unfortunate if this process of learning and mutual influence were to be put at risk by the search for a unified European political science in the belief that only with our own paradigm can we survive in global competition.
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Key Quotes: 'The term pluralism has a positive normative charge but it is used in various ways and, if it is to be more than a liberal platitude, we need to delimitate more clearly our own conceptualization of the term'
'Even though the various epistemological positions differ on their assumptions about social science's capacity to develop covering laws, most researchers combine, in a Gramscian way, pessimism of the reason with optimism of the will' 'The identification of positivist epistemology with quantitative methods on the one hand, and interpretativist epistemology with qualitative methods on the other, hides as much as it reveals' 'In the actual development of research and theorization in the social science, the image that methods and methodologies derive directly from prior epistemological or even ontological positions is misleading' 'It would contradict our central argument to advocate a single European political science or to identify some essential items to distinguish it from the American variety. Yet the European context is important.'
